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MINIMUM DUE PROCESS STANDARDS IN
SELECTIVE SERVICE CASES-PART I
By ANN FAGAN GINGER*
EDITOR'S NOTE: This critical analysis of the present procedures of the
Selective Service System in classifying and ordering men inducted
for service in the armed forces is presented in two parts. Part I is
designed to provide the practicing attorney with an overview of the
Selective Service System from the time of an 18-year-old's initial
registration, through classification procedures, administrative ap-
peals, reclassification, and induction order or prosecution for refusing
induction. Much of the information contained in this part is not gen-
erally accessible to the attorney who takes his first draft case, and
has been gathered by the author through several years of work on
Selective Service cases.
Part II, to be published in the November 1968 issue of the Journal
(Vol. 20, No. 1), includes a chart summarizing the standards of due
process and fair procedure required by the Constitution and Admin-
istrative Procedure Act, and indicating which of these standards are
being met by the Selective Service System. The article concludes
with an attempt to answer two questions: What standards should
govern the System? How can the System provide procedures to meet
these standards?
FUNDAMENTAL problems of due process of law and basic fairness
arise from any study of, or experience with, Selective Service law
and practice. Every lawyer handling a draft case, and every scholar
perusing the 1967 Report of the National Advisory Commission' ap-
pointed by President Johnson to study the draft law runs into these
problems. They require discussion at this time for several reasons.
There is a great increase in the number of criminal prosecutions
being brought against young men who, having gone through the
administrative procedures of the Selective Service System, have re-
fused to accept the classification they were given and the resulting
order of induction into the United States Army. The Department of
Justice reports that in the fiscal year 1967, 1,648 criminal cases were
filed charging violations of the Selective Service law,2 more than three
times as many as in fiscal 1965. The number may be further increased
as the Department of Justice carries out the intention expressed by
* B.A., 1945, LL.B., 1947, University of Michigan; LL.M., 1960, Univer-
sity of California (Boalt Hall). Editor, Civil Liberties Docket; Civil Rights
& Liberties Handbook: Pleadings and Practice; The New Draft Law: A Manual
for Lawyers and Counselors. President, Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library,
Berkeley, California.
1 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON SELECTIVE SERVICE, IN PURSUIT OF
EQurry: WHO SERVES WHEN NOT ALL SERVE? (1967) [hereinafter cited as
MARSHALL COMM'N REP. after its chairman, Burke Marshall].
2 Dep't of Justice, Press Release on Ann. Rep. 3 (Jan. 14, 1968).
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Congress in the Military Selective Service Act of 19673 to proceed
expeditiously with prosecutions under the Act.4 If local boards,
following the October 26, 1967 letter 5 from General Lewis B. Hershey,
Director of the Selective Service System, declare delinquent, reclassify,
and order inducted all men, of whatever classification, who work in
antiwar organizations,6 participate in antiwar demonstrations,7 or
burn8 or return9 their draft cards, the number will be increased still
further.10
Until 1966, draft calls were relatively low and relatively few were
prosecuted for draft refusal." The litigation on draft law questions
was limited in the main to Jehovah's Witnesses denied conscientious
objector or ministerial status, some of whom also complained about
denials of procedural due process.12 However, despite the Supreme
Court's increasing concern that due process be provided from the
beginning 3 to the end 14 of criminal and juvenile15 cases, relatively
3 Pub. L. No. 90-40, 81 Stat. 100 (1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1342)
(amending scattered sections of 50 App. U.S.C.; 10, 37 U.S.C. (1964)) [herein-
after cited as Selec. Serv. Act].
4 See Selec. Serv. Act § 11, amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 462 (1964).
5 See Letter to all members of the Selective Service System in 113 CONG.
REC. 16,375 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1967) (reproduced in full in text accompany-
ing note 99 infra).
6 E.g., John Ratliff was reclassified by Local Board No. 76, Tulsa, Okla.,
because of his "activity as [a] member of SDS." National Student Ass'n v.
Hershey (pending, D.D.C.), 13 Civ. Lia. DocK. No. 127.101 (1968) (allegation
in complaint).
7 See, e.g., Huey v. Local Bd. 22 (D.C. Utah, filed Dec. 1, 1967), 13 Civ.
LIB. DOCK. No. 127.104 (1968).
8 See, e.g., O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 389 U.S. 814 (1967) (No. 233, 1967 Term).
9 E.g., Rev. Paul Gibbons was reclassified by Local Board No. 11, White
Plains, N.Y., because he returned his draft card. National Student Ass'n v.
Hershey (pending, D.D.C.), 13 Civ. LIB. DOCK. No. 127.101 (1968) (allegation
in complaint).
10 However, this article does not discuss the special types of legal issues
raised by these cases. For further information, follow the developments in
National Student Ass'n v. Hershey (pending, D.D.C.), 13 CIV. LaB. DOCK. No.
127.101 (1968), and O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967), cert.
granted, 389 U.S. 814 (1967) (No. 233, 1967 Term).
11 The total number of conscientious objectors convicted of Selective
Service Act violations from 1948 to 1968 has been approximated minimally at
510. The Court Reporter, 19 NEws NoTEs OF THE CENT. CoMnv. OF CONSCIEN-
TIOUS OBJECTORs No. 6, at 4 (1967).
12 E.g., inaccurate resumes of FBI reports furnished conscientious ob-
jectors, instead of complete reports, raised in Simmons v. United States, 348
U.S. 397 (1955), and more recently in DeRemer v. United States, 340 F.2d 712
(8th Cir. 1965).
'3 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (defendant entitled
to counsel at pre-indictment interrogation).
14 See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) (defendant entitled to
counsel at post-trial probation revocation hearing).




little work has been done on the fundamentals of due process in
Selective Service cases.
The question of due process in draft cases may have more general
importance than at first appears. The Selective Service System is
the first major government agency most youth encounter as inde-
pendent adults.16 Their reactions to each interview with a draft
board clerk, each personal appearance before the local board, and each
form and letter received, are long remembered. If they feel that they
are being treated unfairly at every stage, these impressions will
affect their decisions later when they become voters and still later
when they are of the age to govern this country. Conversely, if the
youth participate in a system that does in form and in fact provide
due process of law, and fair and impartial treatment, they will carry
this concept with them into their later life.
Caveat: This discussion is intended to be descriptive and sug-
gestive, rather than definitive, due to limits of both time and space.
The Selective Service System cannot be comprehended or analyzed
quickly. The statute is not short; it contains many lengthy paragraphs
covering numerous subjects, without subheadings, and the regulations
are also numerous; both are poorly indexed. There are no published
opinions at the administrative level, and the practices of the local
boards are not easily discoverable, nor are they uniform.17  Court
opinions have not yet considered the System in the light of the
broadened concepts of due process of law enunciated by the Supreme
Court in related fields during the past decade, and the 1967 Act
changed the statutory language considerably. These two factors
render earlier opinions and law review materials relatively obsolete,
although some old opinions do stand the test of time, particularly
Mr. Justice Murphy's famous concurrence in Estep v. United States. 8
For this reason, few cases and materials are cited.' 9 Textual
footnotes have been minimized to make for easier reading, but in
the process the opportunity to mention interesting peripheral matters
16 Youths who are accused or convicted felons or who are on probation
or parole generally are classified 1-Y or IV-F, and are not commonly called to
serve. Cf. 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.17, 1622.44 (1967).
17 Uniformity is not considered a virtue by the System. See, e.g.,
MARSHALL Col 'V'N REP. 19-20, 27, 31.
18 327 U.S. 114, 125 (1946).
'9 Despite the law review abstention doctrine proclaimed by the editors
of the Harvard Law Review, 81 HARv. L. REv. No. 3 at vii (1968), useful notes
have appeared elsewhere: Comment, Fairness and Due Process Under the
Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1014 (1966); Comment, The SeZec-
tive Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160 (1966); Comment, The Selective Service System:
An Administrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 2123 (1966); and see
case notes on Wolff v. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967), in 81 HARv.
L. REV. 685 (1968); 13 WAYNE L. REv. 722 (1967).
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has been lost.20 Wherever possible, references have been made to the
study of the System by the Marshall Commission. Much fuller
documentation of points of interest can be found in the many Con-
gressional materials published in connection with debate and passage
of the 1967 Act.21
There is more affirmative draft law litigation pending now than
at any time in history,22 and more due process points are being
raised in pretrial and trial of criminal charges. As decisions come
down in this litigation, the System will undoubtedly be subjected to
the kind of close scrutiny its importance requires.
Questions To Be Answered
Within these severe limitations, it is necessary first to consider the
nature of the Selective Service System. This leads to a brief look at
the procedures followed by agencies that are somewhat analogous to
the System, and a lengthy description of the functioning of the Sys-
tem, with attention to the presence or absence of the customary
standards of due process at each stage. Then it must be determined
whether it was the intent of Congress, in providing for "selective"
rather than "universal" service, to require the System to establish a
fair procedure for making the selections. This leaves a formidable
series 'of questions to be asked and answered. They are posed at the
conclusion of Part I; an effort to answer them will be made in Part II.
In Estep v. United States23 in 1946, Mr. Justice Murphy assumed an
affirmative answer to the key question: Are individuals who are sub-
ject to important administrative determinations of their status to be
accorded at least as much due process as corporations receive when
they face important administrative determinations?
The Nature of the Selective Service System
The System Must Meet Quotas
The Selective Service System is an administrative agency charged
with the duty to provide a variable number of qualified men to be
inducted into the armed forces, each time a call is received from the
Department of- Defense, 4 a separate administrative agency bound by
20 For example, the channeling function of the System is not discussed
here. On this topic, see, e.g., SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM (NAT'L HQms.), TEE
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM: ITS CONCEPT, HISTORY AND OPERATION 27-28 (1967);
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 1-6, United States v. O'Connor,
No. 41279 (pending, N.D. Cal.), 13 Civ. Lra. DOCK. No. 127.11 (1968); L.
HERSHEY, OUTLINE OF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SELECTIVE SERVICE, 30-31
(rev. ed. 1965); Channeling (GPO 899-125) (mimeo).
21 See sources cited 'in Changes in the Draft: The Military Selective
Service Act of 1967, 4 COLUm. J. OF L. & Soc. PROB. No. S-2, at S-3 (1967).
22 See cases reported in 13 Civ. LiE. DOCK. Nos. 120. to 129. (1968).
23 327 U.S. 114, 125 (1946) (concurring opinion).
24 32 C.F.R. § 1631.4 (1967).
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a different kind of law (military) enforced by a different judicial
system (from courts-martial through the United States Court of Mili-
tary Appeals). No part of the System can appeal from a call for any
reason. Calls are announced some months in advance; all levels of
the System gear themselves accordingly. Each local board is given a
monthly quota to induct, based on its pool of men classified I-A. The
board must follow a complicated and inexact system for selecting the
I-A's to be inducted,25 and must also place a certain number in class
I-A each month to meet later calls. Meeting these quotas is part of
the job of the draft board members.
In its primary function of manpower procurement, the System is
quite different from other administrative and judicial agencies. For
example, the Internal Revenue Service is not required to collect a
prescribed amount of money from any one type of tax, or from all
forms of taxation, in a given period. The Tax Court is not required
to hand down judgments requiring payment of a certain amount of
money for taxes from a certain number of taxpayers in a given period.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service is not required by any
other agency, or by its own rules, to deport a certain number of
aliens each month, although, like the System, everyone in its juris-
diction (that is, every alien resident in the United States) is required
to register with it. 20 Similarly, no court is given or gives itself a
quota of felons to be convicted each month.
The System Adjudicates Status
From the viewpoint of the individual registrant, it is the respon-
sibility of the System to determine his status. This determination
is made by his local draft board on the basis of information he sup-
plies on forms issued by the System, directives received from the
national director of the System, and statutory and regulatory cate-
gories. The board notifies him of its decision and orders him to act
according to the status it prescribes. That is, if he is classified I-0,
he must do alternative civilian service; if I-A, he must do military
service after induction into the Army. In this respect the System is
similar to other agencies, discussed below.
The System Places Burden of Proof on Registrant
From the outset the System places the burden of proof on the
individuals. within its jurisdiction.2 7  All men who register with the
25 See 32 C.F.R. § 1631.7 (1967). See United States v. Lybrand, No. 67
Cr. 275 (E.D.N.Y., filed Dec. 12, 1967).
26 8 U.S.C. §§ 1302, 1305 (1964).
27 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. I, 1965-1966): "Except as otherwise
provided by statute, the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of
proof .....
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System are presumed to fit into class I-A, unless they allege and
prove that they are entitled to another classification.28 Since any
youth can seek to enlist in the armed forces if he is willing to serve,
and thus avoid the whole draft process, it can be argued that young
men who do not enlist consider I-A the least desirable class. Certainly
those who actively seek another classification do so consider it.
On the other hand, from the point of view of the armed forces,
it is the right, privilege and duty of every citizen to defend his coun-
try, and it would be inequitable for the System to act in any way
that assumed that some youth could not serve.
The Sysiem's Orders Are Enforced Only by Criminal Process
If the registrant refuses to accept his classification, and refuses to
obey the orders of the board, the System refers his case to the United
States Attorney for expeditious criminal prosecution.29 This is wholly
unlike the Internal Revenue procedure by which a taxpayer may con-
test a tax either by paying the tax in full and seeking a refund, or by
refusing to pay the tax and litigating his liability.30 It is also unlike
an administrative determination that a drug company stop using
certain words on a label, or that a company engaged in interstate
commerce pay prescribed minimum wages, either of which orders can
be contested judicially without risking criminal sanctions.3 1  The
draft process, however, begins with an administrative decision as to
status and can end with 5 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine in
the first judicial review of the administrative decision seemingly
permitted under the 1967 Act.
32
Analogous Agencies
Are there any analogous government agencies whose procedures
can be profitably studied to determine what procedures the System
should follow?
At first glance, there are several agencies that determine status
in proceedings that are not clearly judicial or legislative in character,
and that do not end with a punishment of fine or imprisonment.
There are two agencies in the executive branch-the Immigration and
Naturalization Service and the Subversive Activities Control Board;
two in the legislative branch-the House Committee on Un-Ameri-
28 32 C.F.R. § 1622.10 (1967).
29 Selec. Serv. Act § 11, amending 50 ApP. U.S.C. § 462 (1964), as
amended, (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
30 This point will be developed further in Part II, 20 HASTINGS L.J.-(Nov.
1968).
31 Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965-1966) (forfeiture
of misbranded drugs); 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II, 1965-
1966) (civil action to recover wages).
32 Compare Selec. Serv. Act § 8(c), with 50 ApP. U.S.C. § 462(a) (1964).
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can Activities and the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the
Senate Judiciary Committee; and two agencies in the judicial branch-
the juvenile courts and the Adult Authority or other prison parole
agency.
Each of these agencies has argued at various times, precisely
because they do not have the power to punish, that it need not accord
to the individuals who come before it the due process to which they
would be entitled if they were before a criminal court. The Supreme
Court, in the past 20 years, has ruled that each of these agencies must
accord certain rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights even if the
status 33 decided by the agency is not a punishment, the orders to the
individual arising from that status do not involve punishment,34 and
the limitations on the actions of the individual arising from the
status 35 are not technically penalties.
Are there other administrative agencies related to the defense
function of the federal government that follow procedures that might
be relevant to those of the System? Certainly the procurement of
money is directly related to defense; it is necessary to pay the service-
men as well as to purchase materiel. The Internal Revenue Service
does not change its procedures during a national emergency or war.
At all times it is covered by the Administrative Procedure Act
except for the Act's provisions concerning hearings, which are not
applied because a formal court, the Tax Court, has been established to
fulfill the functions normally filled by an administrative hearing.
The procedures of the Internal Revenue Service, from beginning to
end, assume the right to counsel and the availability of counsel.
Functioning of the Selective Service System
From ihe Point of View of the Registrant
Form 100
The law requires every male in the United States to register for
the draft at age 18, but sends him no notice of this. Registration is
33 I.e., deportable alien (Immigration & Naturalization Service); member
of Communist organization (Subversive Activities Control Board); un-Amer-
ican (HUAC); delinquent youth (juvenile courts); parole violator (e.g.
California Adult Authority).
34 E.g., to be deported, compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952), with Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966); to register
with the SACB, Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70,
81 (1965); to answer questions before HUAC, Emspak v. United States, 349
U.S. 190 (1955); Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966); to go to a
youth center, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967); to return to prison, Mempa
v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
35 E.g., supervisory parole of deportable aliens, see United States v.
Witkovich, 353 U.S. 194, 201 (1957); inability to use a passport, Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); inability to work in a defense plant,
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
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accomplished by his going to the local draft board office and regis-
tering with the clerk. After registration, the clerk sends the regis-
trant SSS Form 100,86 the basic classification questionnaire, which he
is to fill out and return within 10 days of the date it is sent to him.
The form is quite short and contains little explanatory material.
The answers the registrant gives on this form serve as the basis for
the board's classifying him.
Failure to register at age 18 is a criminal offense.37 Failure to
complete Form 100 results in a finding of delinquency and an imme-
diate reclassification and order of induction.38 Answering the ques-
tions on Form 100 provides proof that the registrant is 18 and subject
to the draft law. The form seeks also information on the registrant's
schooling, family status, and educational and medical history. It is
not accompanied by an instruction booklet describing the Selective
Service System, similar to the annual tax instruction booklets, written
in layman's language, which are sent to taxpayers. After publication
of the Marshall Commission report, which criticized the System for its
public relations inadequacies, 39 the System issued several short
pamphlets describing some aspects of Selective Service. One pam-
phlet advises the registrant:
Where To Get Help
Anytime you want information not given to you in notices or other
mail, ask any Local Board Clerk, your Government Appeal Agent,
your Advisor to Registrants, or your State Director. All will be
happy to help you. 40
These leaflets and the classification form do not suggest that the
registrant may need the assistance of a lawyer in order to deter-
mine the classification for which he should apply; that he has a right
not to answer questions that might incriminate him; or that any-
thing he writes on the form can be used against him later in a
federal criminal prosecution.
The classification form does not explain that it can be read by
persons other than the local board and registrant. It does not quote
from the regulation which permits examination and copying of any
registrant's file by any person in the Selective Service System, United
States Attorney's office, the FBI, or any other federal or state agency,
or by any other person who has received permission from the Director
of the System. 41 A registrant who discloses any sexual deviation,
political activity or criminal behavior on this or any form does so on
36 Classification Questionnaire, SSS Form 100 (Revised 9-15-66).
37 50 App. U.S.C. §§ 453, 462(a) (1964), as amended, Selec. Serv. Act §
11(a).
38 32 C.F.R. §§ 1642.4, 1642.13 (1967).
39 MARSHALL COMM'N REP. 6, 35-36.
40 SELECrIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, YOU... AN =mn DRAFT 6 (1967).
41 32 C.F.R. § 1670.8 (1967).
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what amounts to a public record.
The form does not list offices or phone numbers where the regis-
trant can obtain expert impartial answers to questions or advice on
how to describe his situation accurately and effectively on the form.
There is no mention on Form 100, or on any other form given to the
registrant, or on the walls at the draft board, that there is a book of
regulations or a statute that can be consulted for information on pro-
cedures or classifications. Even for the registrant who seeks legal
advice there are limitations, since there is no service, governmental or
private, to which a lawyer can subscribe to keep abreast of adminis-
trative developments in draft law. At best the attorney can sub-
scribe to an inexpensive service of the Government Printing Office
and obtain the regulations and Local Board Memos, but many months
elapse between publication of a new regulation in the Federal Register
and the receipt of a copy of the regulation by a subscriber.
Form 100 does not list all classifications to which a registrant
may be entitled; it does not describe the qualifications for each clas-
sification, or the consequences of being placed in each classification.
If the registrant provides sufficient information to indicate that he
may be entitled to a deferment, the clerk of the local board will send
him another form seeking more specific facts on that claim. How-
ever, Form 100 does not ask for certain kinds of information the
registrant should give in order to qualify for certain types of clas-
sifications, nor does it indicate to the clerk that certain registrants
will need a second form.
For example, it is more or less common knowledge that a mar-
ried man who is living at home with his wife and minor child is en-
titled to a Ii-A deferment; 42 although the facts establishing this clas-
sification are requested on Form 100, relatively few 18-year-olds
will be eligible for Il-A for this reason. However, the draft law has
also always provided for "hardship" deferments for men who have
people dependent on them for assistance that cannot be replaced by
the payment of the Army allotment check sent to draftees.43 If a
registrant has parents who are receiving aid of any kind from a
governmental or private agency, are blind, mentally ill, hospital-
ized, or have severe psychiatric problems, induction of an 18-year-old
son may leave a void in the family structure that cannot be filled.
No mention is made of deferments based on "hardship" on Form 100.
Nor does the form mention that a youth should list any children he
has, whether or not legitimate, although he may be contributing to
42 Id. § 1622.30(a), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11360, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787
(1967).
48 Selec. Serv. Act § 6, amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(h) (1964); 32
C.F.R. § 1622.30(b) (1967).
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their support and emotional stability.44 The form does not mention,
either, that the father of a child living in his home is not entitled to a
III-A deferment for which he would otherwise qualify if he has
requested and received a II-S (student) deferment since July 1,
1967.
45
The form does not provide space for a youth to mention his plans
to attend a college as soon as he has earned enough money,4 or his
plan to participate in a meaningful apprenticeship program that does
not come within the present limits of programs acceptable to the
System but for which a case for deferment could be made.
If a registrant does not understand the questions on Form 100,
he is likely to go to the place where he got the form, the local draft
board, and to the person who registered him, the board clerk, for
answers. The clerks customarily give the impression that they know
the answers to questions; 47 and, of course, the unpaid volunteer draft
board members are not present at the board during working hours,
so they cannot be consulted by a puzzled registrant.
Clerks to local boards are paid civil service employees with no
required training in administrative law, statutory construction,
or constitutional principles. Many clerks have served with local
boards since World War 11.48 They are not given instructions on the
significance of changes in the draft act, new regulations, new Local
Board Memos, or confidential communications from General Her-
shey. Since the regulations do not contain full or partial texts or dis-
cussions of United States Supreme Court opinions in draft law cases,
there is no method by which draft board clerks are made aware of
their existence, or are encouraged to read them. Yet the clerk's
preparation of the cases for the board's review is, in effect, an initial
classification.49
Local Draft Boards
All decisions on classification of registrants are made by local
draft boards, subject to an appeal procedure discussed below. A clear
picture of the composition, attitudes, and methods of work of the
4,080 local boards is now available from the study made by the Mar-
44 It is possible that a registrant may be entitled to a HI-A deferment
on the ground of extreme hardship if his dependents are emotionally unstable.
See THE NEw DRAFT LAW: A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND CouNsELoRs 235:27-29
(A. Ginger ed. 1967) (Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Box 673, Berkeley, Cal. 94701).
45 Selec. Serv. Act § 6, amending 50 APP. U.S.C. § 456(h) (1964).
46 See Boyd v. Clark, No. 67 Civ. 2529 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 29, 1967)
(complaint, affidavits, memos available at Meiklejolui Civil Liberties Library,
Berkeley).
47 See MARSHALL COmm'N REP. 21.
48 Id.
49 Id.
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shall Commission. Probably as an outcome of this study, Congress
amended the draft law5" and the Service amended its regulations5 '
so that some changes in composition have already taken place in some
draft boards since July 1, 1967, the effective date of the new act.
The following description assumes that all required statutory changes
have been implemented.
The local board consists of three or more people who probably
do not know the registrant or his family on a personal basis. They
serve a large geographic area and may not even be from the com-
munity from which the registrant comes, 52 particularly if the com-
munity is a ghetto area that has changed composition recently.
53
Most of the board members are men,54 are veterans of military serv-
ice,5 5 are white,56 and are white collar workers, 57 although few are
lawyers or administrators with experience in interpreting statutes and
regulations.5  They are well over 30 years of age59 and have served
on the board for many years.60 They are not given a course of in-
struction on their duties nor a handbook describing the System and
its operation.
Since they are unpaid volunteers with other full-time employ-
ment, and are not offered brush-up courses on the law, they may
not have studied the new statute passed July 1, 1967, or the reg-
ulations issued under it. They may not have studied the over 100
Local Board Memos issued by General Hershey or his confidential
letters to local boards. It is extremely doubtful that they have all
read recent United States Supreme Court or courts of appeals deci-
sions on draft cases. There are no standards for competence and no
education or experience qualifications for draft board members.
50 Selec. Serv. Act § 8, amending 50 A'p. U.S.C. § 460 (b) (3) (1964).
51 Exec. Order No. 11,360, § 3, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787, amending 32 C.F.R. §
1604.52 (1967).
52 In San Francisco, 6 of the city's 40 board members live in the same
district in which they serve. See Hunn, Draft Boards-A Guardian Probe,
The [San Francisco] Bay Guardian, Dec. 19, 1967, map at 3, cols. 3-5.
53 Margolis, Trying A Case Under the Selective Service Law, 26 GUILD
PRACTITIONER 100, 103 (1967).
54 At the time of the Marshall Commission Report, all members of local
boards were male. MARSHALL COMM'N REP. 19. However, Selec. Serv. Act
§ 8(b), amending 50 APP. U.S.C. § 460(b) (3) (1964), provides that "[n]o
citizen shall be denied membership ... on account of sex."
G5 MARSHALL COmm'N REP. 19, Table 1.3 at 74.
56 Id. at 19, Table 1.6 at 75.
57 Id. at 19, Table 1.5 at 75.
58 See id.
59 Id. at 19, Table 1.1 at 73.
60 See id. at 19, Table 1.2 at 73. See generally Hunn, Draft Boards-A
Guardian Probe, The [San Francisco] Bay Guardian, Dec. 19, 1967, at 1, col. 2
(study of members of San Francisco's 10 draft boards).
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The local boards meet in private.0' Only recently has it been
required that the names of the members be posted in local board
offices; some board chairmen may authorize clerks to release the
local addresses of board members.62 There is no procedure by which
citizens can observe or scrutinize the decisions or methods of work
of board members, 3 and there is no annual evaluation of the pro-
cedures followed or of the correctness of local board decisions by
the state directors, General Hershey, or an independent agency.
4
Classification Procedure
The local board is the first and most important decision-making
body in the case of each registrant. It acts as does a judge in a judicial
proceeding or a hearing officer in another administrative agency. Its
original determination in each case is prescribed by the regula-
tions:65 it must decide that each registrant is I-A unless his Form
100 shows that he is entitled to an obvious deferment, e.g., as an
undergraduate college student under 24 years of age (II-S), as the
father of a child who has not had a II-S deferment since July 1, 1967
(III-A), or as a minister (IV-D). I-A is the residual classification of
each registrant.
When the registrant does not supply sufficient information on
his Form 100 (or other form) to permit his classification, the local
board is required to act as investigator.0 The board has subpoena
power.0 7 It is not known to what extent local boards use this power,
or authorize their clerks to obtain information not in the record of
the registrants through queries to persons other than the registrants.
Each local board handles between 28 and 55,000 registrants at any
given time. 8 According to one study, San Francisco boards averaged
less than one minute's consideration per case during 1967.09
01 "Privacy results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our
knowledge as to what in fact goes on .... " Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 448 (1966).
62 32 C.F.R. §§ 1606.62-1606.63, 33 Fed. Reg. 4678 (Mar. 18, 1968), issued
after Martin v. Neuschel, Civil No. 68-301 (E.D. Pa., Feb. 13, 1968) (court
order directing local board to disclose names and addresses reprinted in 114
CoNG. REc. 953 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968); see also MARSHALL CoAn'xf REP. 20.
0S See text accompanying notes 80-81 infra.
04 Selec. Serv. Act § 10, amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 460(g) (1964), re-
quires only that the Director file a semiannual report with Congress on the
operation of the System.
05 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.10, 1623.2 (1967).
00 Id. § 1626.23.
67 Id. § 1621.15.
08 MARSHALL CommI'N REP. 17.
09 Hunn, Draft Boards-A Guardian Probe, The [San Francisco] Bay
Guardian, Dec. 19, 1967, at 3, col. 3.
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The classification of the registrant by the local board is sent to
the registrant on a classification form (SSS Form 110), without ex-
planation. If the registrant claimed a deferment on his Form 100,
or in subsequent communications with the board, the board does not
discuss this claim or give the reasons for rejecting it.
The notice to the registrant giving his status as I-A announces
that he may appeal within 30 days. 0 Since spring 1967, many boards
have added a statement that the registrant may talk to the legal
advisor to the local board, a volunteer who is not required to be a
lawyer. The form does not state whether the advisor is a lawyer.71
Many boards do not have legal advisors, relying instead on local
board clerks and appeal agents, discussed below. Nothing is said on
the form suggesting the wisdom of the registrant talking to an attor-
ney other than the board's legal advisor or to a draft counseling
agency.
Personal Appearance
After an adverse decision and receipt of a Form 110, the registrant
can either seek a personal appearance before the local board to ask
the board to change its classification, or he can appeal to the appeal
board, or he can do both.7 2  The notice of his right to appeal does
not contain a set of instructions concerning the appeal or personal
appearance, or a list of references to relevant material that might
assist the registrant in preparing for these procedures, such as the
statute, SSS Regulations, or Local Board Memos.
If the registrant seeks a personal appearance, he can appear in
person before the local board.1 3 Since he disagrees with the previ-
ous decision of the board, to him it is an adversary proceeding.
There is no procedure for challenging board members for ignor-
ance of the law, or of comparative religion, although such ignorance
may result in erroneous classifications. Neither can they be chal-
lenged for prejudice against the registrant because of his racej 4 reli-
gion, haircut, apparel, or for general opposition to granting conscien-
tious objector7 5 or other types of deferments.
The registrant is specifically denied the assistance of counsel at
the personal appearance.76 He has no right to present witnesses in
70 SSS Form 217 (Rev. 5-11-67).
71 See id.
72 32 C.F.R. §§ 1624.1, 1626.2, as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,350, 32 Fed.
Reg. 6961 (1967).
73 Id. § 1624.1 (a), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,350, 32 Fed. Reg. 6961
(1967).
74 See Brief for Appellant, United States v. Du Vernay, No. 24,132 (5th
Cir., filed appx. Oct., 1967) (on file in Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library,
Berkeley).
75 Cf. MARsHALL COmm'N RP. 108-09.
70 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1967). One board's explanation of its refusal
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his behalf; this is discretionary with the board.7 7 He cannot cross-
examine any private person, or board clerk, who may have spoken
against his getting the deferment for which he applied. He is not
told what, if any, evidence was presented to the board that affected
its original decision. The board furnishes no stenographer to record
the discussion at the personal appearance, and he cannot bring into
the hearing a professional stenographer or tape recorder.78 He may
be permitted to bring a friend to sit and listen so that he can later
record what he recalls. The only transcript or record of the conduct
of the appearance is made by the registrant himself, and should be
submitted to the local board immediately after the appearance;79 it
then becomes part of his file. However, the registrant is not told to
submit such a report.
The personal appearance is never open to the public. Specific
requests to attend board meetings for general informational purposes,
and not due to interest in the particular cases to be considered, have
been rejected.80 Similarly, requests by registrants to have open
personal appearances which can be attended by family, friends, and
the public, have been rejected even when the registrant has specifi-
cally waived his right to privacy.81
The board members make no statement at the opening of the
hearing concerning the rights of the registrant or the fact that any-
thing he says may be used against him administratively by the
System or in a later criminal prosecution. The advisor to the regis-
trant is never present, although the local board may request the
government appeal agent to attend.82
The personal appearance has no form or structure. Frequently
it opens with the registrant introducing himself to the board members
and asking their names, which sometimes are not given. Local boards
are not given instructions on the conduct of these appearances, nor
to permit counsel at a personal appearance: "Since the registrant is under
oath at the appearance, it is the policy, that the registrant represents himself."
Letter from Local Bd. No. 82, North Hollywood, Cal., to H. Berman, SS 4-82-
43-1351, Feb. 23, 1968, on file in Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library, Berkeley.
77 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1967).
78 See, e.g., account of personal appearance of John R. miller, SS 4-42-
43-326, before Local Bd. No. 42, San Francisco, on Jan. 23, 1968, at 2, in
Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library, Berkeley.
79 See discussion in Comment, The Selective Service System: An Admin.-
istrative Obstacle Course, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 2123, 2154-56 (1966).
so See, e.g., correspondence between Mrs. Donald C. Lee of Oakland, Cal.,
and local boards and the California and National Headquarters of the Selec-
tive Service System, Aug.-Oct. 1967, on file in Meiklejohn Civil Liberties
Library, Berkeley.
81 Cf. letter from Local Bd. No. 82, North Hollywood, Cal., to H. Berman,
SS 4-82-43-1351, supra note 76.
82 32 C.F.R. § 1604.71(d) (2) (1967).
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do they give instructions to registrants on what to do or say.
Frequently the registrant goes to the appearance prepared to answer
questions asked by the board members who, instead, are prepared to
answer questions the registrant asks them.83 The board may im-
pose any time limitations on the appearance they deem appropriate. 84
Since no indication was given to the registrant why his requested
classification was rejected, he cannot know what he needs to prove in
order to reverse the decision of the board members.
Board's Decision
The decision by the board after this personal appearance can
be based on matters outside the record-the recommendation of the
board clerk,85 confidential communications from General Hershey,
and all other information "pertinent to the classification of a regis-
trant, presented to it."8 6 There are no standards of proof to be met;
there is no requirement, as in procedures followed by agencies gov-
erned by the Administrative Procedure Act, that reliable, probative
and substantial evidence support the decision.8 7 The board is simply
directed to
consider the new information which it receives and, if the local board
determines that such new information justifies a change in the reg-
istrant's classification, the local board shall reopen and classify the
registrant anew. If the local board determines that such new infor-
mation does not justify a change in the registrant's classification, it
shall not reopen the registrant's classification.8 8
The decision of one local board may be based on criteria or atti-
tudes quite different from those of another board in the same area.
There is no effort at uniformity of decision, since this is not con-
sidered a virtue.8 9 The important thing about local boards is that
they are local men and women from the community, according to
the proponents (particularly General Hershey) of the local board sys-
tem.9 0
Each decision by a local board is made with knowledge of future
monthly calls, which vary from month to month and year to year,
and are set by military agencies unconnected with the local board.
83 E.g., account of personal appearance of John R. Miller, supra note 78,
at 3.
84 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(b) (1967).
85 See MARSHALL CoImnm'N REP. 21.
86 32 C.F.R. § 1622.1(c) (1967).
87 For the APA standard of proof, see 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (Supp. II, 1965-
1966).
88 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(c) (1967).
89 See discussion of Sen. Morse's proposed amendment to the 1967 Act to
encourage national criteria and uniformity of standards for classification, 113
CONG. R c. 6761-70, 6773-74 (daily ed. May 11, 1967). (The amendment was
defeated by a vote of 6 to 68. Id. at 6774).
90 See MARSaALI Co¢nvf'N REP. 20.
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After the personal appearance, the decision of the board is sent
to the registrant without stating the reason for granting or denying
the requested classification. The board's notice tells the registrant
he may appeal the classification within 30 days, and mentions that he
is entitled to talk to an appeal agent from the appeal board. It does
not state that the appeal agent has the dual responsibility to advise
the registrant and the appeal board,91 and in no case does it advise
whether the appeal agent is a lawyer. Th registrant is not advised
that he might profit from advice from a private attorney or draft
counseling agency. Nor is he notified that General Hershey has or-
dered appeal agents (as well as legal advisors) to report any informa-
tion they receive, from interviews with registrants or otherwise, con-
cerning possible delinquency or statutory violations, in order to ex-
pedite reclassification, induction, or prosecution.92
Appeal Board
When the registrant files his appeal with his local board, his file
is sent to the appeal board, which usually consists of five members
who are not subject to challenge. They must be citizens who are
not members of the armed forces or the reserves, who are between
30 and 75 years old, with less than 25 years of service on the board.
3
They must be residents of the area and representative of its activities,
including one member each from industry and labor, one physician
and one lawyer, and perhaps one from agriculture.94
The registrant is not permitted to appear before the appeal board
in person or by counsel. The board "shall not receive or consider
any information other than the following: (1) Information contained
in the record received from the local board. (2) General information
concerning economic, industrial and social conditions." 95 Neither the
Act nor the regulations spell out the standard of proof to be followed
by the appeal board in considering classifications made by the local
board.
In several jurisdictions where appeal board practices were studied
in connection with criminal charges against registrants for draft
refusal, it developed that the boards, staffed by volunteers, met once
or twice a month to consider a tremendous volume of files. They
decided a case every 10 seconds in a 4- or 5-hour session.9 6
91 32 C.F.R. §§ 1604.71(d) (4), (5) (1967).
92 See note 99 infra, and Local Board Memorandum No. 85 (Oct. 24, 1967).
93 Id. § 1604.22, as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787
(1967).
94 Id.
95 Id. § 1626.24(b), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787
(1967).
96,Margolis, Trying a Case under the Selective Service Law, 26 GumD
PSrAcTiONESR 100, 103 (1967).
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If the decision of the appeal board is not unanimous, the regis-
trant can appeal to the President.9 7  This is the third unstructured
appeal. The registrant is given no form to fill out and no charges to
answer.
Discretion of Director
The first "Miscellaneous Provision" in the SSS Regulations pro-
vides:
The Director of Selective Service, notwithstanding any other provi-
sions of the regulations in this [classification] chapter, may direct
that any registrant shall be classified or reclassified without regard
to his eligibility for a particular classification.9 8
Perhaps under the authority of this regulation, on October 26,
1967, General Lewis B. Hershey, Director of the System, sent a letter
to all members of the System, which became public in November.
General Hershey described the basic purpose of the System and the
bases for reclassification in the letter, set out here in full:
The basic purpose and the objective of the Selective Service
System is the survival of the United States. The principal means
used to that end is the military obligation placed by law upon all
males of specified age groups. The complexities of the means of
assuring survival are recognized by the broad authority for defer-
ment from military service in the National health, safety, or interest.
Important facts too often forgotten or ignored are that the military
obligation for liable age groups is universal and that deferments are
given only when they serve the National interest. It is obvious that
any action that violates the Military Selective Service Act or the
Regulations, or the related processes cannot be in the National inter-
est. It follows that those who violate them should be denied defer-
ment in the National interest. It also follows that illegal activity
which interferes with recruiting or causes refusal of duty in the mili-
tary or naval forces could not by any stretch of the imagination be
construed as being in support of the National interest.
The Selective Service System has always recognized that it was
created to provide registrants for the Armed Forces, rather than to
secure their punishment for disobedience of the Act and Regulations.
There occasionally will be registrants, however, who will refuse to
comply with their legal responsibilities, or who will fail to report as
ordered, or refuse to be inducted. For these registrants, prosecution
in the courts of the United States must follow with promptness and
effectiveness. All members of the Selective Service System must
give every possible assistance to every law enforcement agency and
especially to United States Attorneys.
It is to be hoped that misguided registrants will recognize the
long-range significance of accepting their obligations now, rather than
hereafter regretting their actions performed under unfortunate influ-
ences of misdirected emotions, or possibly honest but wholly illegal
advice, or even completely vicious efforts to cripple, if not to destroy,
97 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3, as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,350, 32 Fed. Reg.
6961 (1967).
98 Id. § 1622.60 (1967).
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the unity vital to the existence of a nation and the preservation of the
liberties of each of our citizens.
Demonstrations, when they become illegal, have produced and
will continue to produce much evidence that relates to the basis for
classification and in some instances, even to violation of the Act and
Regulations. Any material of this nature received in National Head-
quarters or any other segment of the System should be sent to State
Directors for forwarding to appropriate Local Boards for their con-
sideration.
A Local Board, upon receipt of this information, may reopen the
classification of the registrant, classify him anew, and if evidence of
violation of the Act and Regulations is established, also to declare the
registrant to be a delinquent and to process him accordingly. This
should include all registrants with remaining liability up to 35 years
of age.
If the United States Attorney should desire to prosecute before
the Local Board has ordered the registrant for induction, full coopera-
tion will be given him and developments in the case should be re-
ported to the State Director and by him to National Headquarters.
Evidence received from any source indicating efforts by non-
registrants to prevent induction or in any way interfere illegally with
the operation of the Military Selective Service Act or with recruiting
or its related processes, will be reported in as great detail as facts are
available to State Headquarters and National Headquarters so that
they may be made available to United States Attorneys.
Registrants presently in Class IV-F or I-Y who have already been
reported for delinquency, if they are found still to be delinquent,
should again be ordered to report for physical examination to ascer-
tain whether they may be acceptable in the light of current circum-
stances.
All elements of the Selective Service System are urged to ex-
pedite responsive classifications and the processing of delinquents to
the greatest possible extent consistent with sound procedure. 99
One more aspect of the discretion of members of the System is
set forth in the regulations:
Compliance by a local board or any other agency of the Selective
Service System with any or all of the procedures prescribed by the
regulations in this part [on delinquents] is not a condition precedent
to the prosecution of any person under the provisions of section 12 of
the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.100
Procedures in Conscientious Objector Cases
The procedure just described applies to all registrants, including
applicants for conscientious objector status (1-0 and I-A-O). How-
ever, a few more steps in CO cases must be described to present a
99 Letter to all members of the Selective Service System in 113 CoNa.
REc. 16,375 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1967). For Congressional criticism of this
letter, see id. at 16,884 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 1967) (Sen. Hart); id. at 17,409-10
(daily ed. Nov. 30, 1967) (Sen. Young); id. at 18,488-95 (daily ed. Dec. 13,
1967) (Sen. E. Kennedy); id. at 16,984-85 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1967) (Rep.
Kastenmeier), See also Local Board Memorandum No. 85 (Oct. 24, 1967).




full picture of the due process problems in the Selective Service
System.'0
When the 18-year-old registrant fills out the first classification
questionnaire, it contains a paragraph entitled "Series VIII" which
says:
(Do not sign this series unless you claim to be
a conscientious objector)
I claim to be a conscientious objector by reason of my religious train-
ing and belief and therefore request the local board to furnish me a
Special Form for Conscientious Objector (SSS Form 150).102
There is no explanation of the words "conscientious objector" or the
phrase "by reason of religious training and belief." The words in
an earlier version of Form 100, "I am conscientiously opposed to par-
ticipation in war,"'0 3 have been deleted. There is no suggestion on
the form that the registrant may need advice in order to know whether
he is qualified to sign this part of the form. The statutory definition
of CO is not reprinted in the form; there is no reference to up-to-date
material the registrant might consult to find an accurate definition of
CO, such as the new statutory definition or the Supreme Court's
definition in United States v. Seeger.
04
If any 18-year-old registrant does sign his name to Series VIII, he
shortly receives a copy of SSS Form 150,105 which he must fill out
and return within 10 days of the date it was mailed to him. The
first item on the form requires a choice between I-A-O and I-0 sta-
tus, phrased as follows:
Series I.-CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION
(A) I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. I, there-
fore, claim exemption from combatant training and service in the
Armed Forces.
(B) I am, by reason of my religious training and belief, con-
scientiously opposed to participation in war in any form and I am
further conscientiously opposed to participation in noncombatant
training and service in the Armed Forces. I, therefore, claim exemp-
tion from both combatant and noncombatant training and service in
the Armed Forces.
Then the form gives the instruction: "Every item in this series must
be completed. If more space is needed use extra sheets of paper,"
and asks:
101 See generally HANDBOOK FOR CONSCMxNTIOUS OBJECTORS (9th ed. A.
Tatum 1967) (published by Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors).
102 Classification Questionnaire, SSS Form 100 (revised 9-15-66).
103 Id. (revised 3-22-61) (emphasis added).
104 380 U.S. 163, 165-66 (1965).
'05 Special Form for Conscientious Objector, SSS Form No. 150 (revised
2-9-59).
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Series II.-RELIGIOUS TRAINING AND BELIEF
1. Do you believe in a Supreme Being? El Yes El No.
2. Describe the nature of your belief which is the basis of your claim
made in Series I above [quoted supra], and state whether or not your
belief in a Supreme Being involves duties which to you are superior
to those arising from any human relation.
3. Explain how, when, and from whom or from what source you
received the training and acquired the belief which is the basis of
your claim made in Series I above.
4. Give the name and present address of the individual upon whom
you rely most for religious guidance.
6. Describe the actions and behavior in your life which in your
opinion most conspicuously demonstrate the consistency and depth
of your religious convictions.
7. Have you ever given public expression, written or oral, to the
views herein expressed as the basis for your claim made in Series I
above?
Series III.-GENERAL BACKGROUND
5 (a) State the religious denomination or sect of your father.
(b) State the religious denomination or sect of your mother.
Series IV.-PARTICIPATION IN ORGANIZATIONS
2. Are you a member of a religious sect or organization? E] Yes E] No.
(e) Describe carefully the creed or official statements of said
religious sect or organization [to which you belong] in relation to
participation in war.
The registrant answers these questions with the philosophical,
religious, and rhetorical skill of an 18-year-old. Lawyers and draft
counselors frequently describe the difficulties their clients have with
these questions, whether they are 34-year-old doctors, 25-year-old
philosophy or English majors, or 18-year-old high school dropouts. 0 6
This form has not been changed since 1959. It does not reflect
the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Seeger,
0 7
which would require deletion of several of the questions listed above,
changes in other listed questions, and a different tone to the form in
general, recognizing the existence of sincere conscientious objectors
106 The author's experience is that registrants with an excellent command
of the language and considerable education seek to write clear and meaning-
ful answers to each question on the form; this takes considerable thought and
redrafting, frequently resulting in lengthy essays. Registrants with little
ability to communicate ideas and feelings by means of writing become more
inhibited when faced with Form 150. They have difficulty putting down any
meaningful answers.
107 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
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without ties to organized churches.108 The form does not reflect the
language of the 1967 statute that changed the definition of CO by de-
leting the italicized words:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any per-
son to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
As used in this subsection, the term "religious training and belief"
in this connection means an individual's belief in a relation to a Su-
preme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological,
or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code .... 109
None of the words in the section are defined on the form, and there
is no instruction booklet accompanying the form.
A careful reading of the form indicates that it is solely concerned
with the religiosity of the registrant. No question asks for a dis-
cussion of the registrant's attitude about participation in war or in
the mass use of armed force by soldiers to achieve a national objec-
tive, that is, war. The closest the form comes to asking about the
registrant's belief in the use of military force is question 5, which
says: "Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe in the use of
force?" Many registrants have difficulty answering this question
because they do not see "force" as solely related to "military force";
they consider the use of force a fact of physical or social life.
The form does not suggest that the registrant should supplement
his answers on the form by filing letters in support of his claim.
The form does not indicate the method by which the truth of the
facts alleged by the registrant on the form will be investigated or
the sincerity of the registrant ascertained by the local board. How-
ever, Series V says:
Give here the names and other information indicated concerning per-
sons who could supply information as to the sincerity of your pro-
fessed convictions against participation in war...
and provides for the names, addresses, occupations, and relation-
ships of four persons.
Until July 1, 1967, the Act required the FBI to investigate each
CO applicant who appealed the denial of a CO classification;'1 0 all
references were interviewed, as well as former employers and teach-
ers listed elsewhere on the form. The FBI then prepared a report
of its investigation which was given to the System; the registrant
received only a resum6 of the report, with all names of informants
deleted and their identities somewhat masked. Several CO appli-
108 See Smith, Conscientious Objection to Military Service: A Layman's
View, 26 GuID PAciioNER 65 (1967).
109 Selec. Serv. Act § 7, amending 50 APP. U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964).
110 See 50 APP. U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964), as amended, Selec. Serv. Act § 7.
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cants litigated the inadequacy and inaccuracy of the resum6s.1n The
1967 Act eliminated this FBI investigation and report.11"2 There is
now no procedure spelled out in the regulations or known to the
public by which the validity of CO claims is investigated by the local
board or any other part of the System. If no such investigations are
being made by competent investigators, the continued use of Series V
may mislead applicants so that they fail to ask references to send
letters to the local board.
Many registrants do not fill out Series VIII at age 18 despite
their conscientious objection to participation in war. Some CO's who
have not been counseled and who are eligible for a 11-S deferment
or who expect to be disqualified on physical grounds assume they
should not fill out the CO form until their other deferments are ex-
hausted. And, in fact, under the regulations the CO application cannot
be considered by the local board until other deferments have been
exhausted," 3 although it should be filed as soon as a registrant ar-
rives at the CO position. Many CO's firmly believe that applying for
the Form 150 will prejudice their local boards against them and make
it difficult for them to get other classifications to which they are
entitled, such as 11-S, IV-F, or I-Y. Some other registrants who are
sincere pacifists and would qualify for CO status have never heard
of the phrase "conscientious objection," of I-0 status, or of "alterna-
tive civilian service," and the language of Series VIII on Form 100
does not strike them as being applicable to them until someone
discusses it with them. Others know they are conscientiously op-
posed to participation in war, but know that they are not Quakers or
members of any other peace church and therefore "know" they do
not qualify and cannot sign.
Still others have no thoughts about conscientious objection to
war at age 18. In this society there is a strong stigma attached to
being a coward, and few youths at 18 are prepared to risk any chal-
lenge to their recently acquired manhood by admitting they are CO's
or are thinking about philosophical problems of killing other human
beings. After a few years in college or working, sometimes after
becoming fathers, some young men of 20 or 22 discover that they
cannot kill another human being; others decide they cannot kill in
the present war. Some of these men learn about applying for CO
status and request Form 150. A few come to this decision after being
reclassified I-A, others on receipt of an induction order,114 and still
111 See cases cited note 12 supra.
112 See note 110 supra.
113 See 32 C.F.R. § 1623.2 (1967).
"4 See, e.g., United States v. Gearey, 379 F.2d 915, 917 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1967).
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others only after enlisting or being inducted. 15
Any registrant who requests a copy of Form 150 after age 18 will
be sent the form to complete and return. However, this will be
considered "late filing" of the form by the local board, and the most
important task for the registrant will be to convince the board that he
is sincere in his antiwar beliefs despite his failure to fill out the
form at age 18.
Under the 1967 Act, an applicant for CO status is treated the
same as an applicant for any other type of deferment. If his re-
quest for I-0 classification is rejected, he can request a personal ap-
pearance before his local board where the procedures described above
prevail. On passage of the 1967 Act, the System amended the regula-
tions to delete any discussion of the "Supreme Being" requirement.116
The regulations do not now contain any guidelines or standards for
decisions on CO applications.
If the board again rejects the request for 1-0 status, the registrant
may appeal to the appeal board, which decides the case without
personal appearance by the registrant or his counsel, on the basis of
the material in the file, and "general information concerning economic,
industrial, and social conditions.
'1" 7
The registrant may take a presidential appeal if the decision of
the appeal board is not unanimous."
8
Special Problems of Black Registrants
A Negro registrant from Watts or any other ghetto is more likely
to be drafted after being found acceptable to the Army than a white
youth.119  He is more likely to be killed in Vietnam 120 than a white
registrant. These are facts found by the Marshall Commission.
Whether they prove that the System does not discriminate against
black registrants and abides by the constitutional and statutory re-
quirement of equal protection,1 2  or whether they prove unequal
115 See the procedures for applying for discharges from the armed serv-
ices on the basis of having come to a conscientious objector position after
entry into the service, AR 635-20, at issue in Brown v. McNamara, 263 F.
Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1967), appeal docketed, No. 16,454, 3d Cir. (July 1967).
116 Exec. Order No. 11,360, §§ 5(b), (e), 32 Fed. Reg. 9787, amending 32
C.F.R. §§ 1622.11, 1622.14 (1967).
117 32 C.F.R. § 1626.24(b), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed.
Reg. 9787 (1967).
118 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3, as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,350, 32 Fed. Reg.
6961 (1967).
119 MARSHALL COm-'N REP. 22.
120 See id. at 26.
121 50 App. U.S.C. § 455(a) (1964), as amended, Selec. Serv. Act § 3; 32
C.F.R. § 1622.1(d) (1967).
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treatment 2 2 may depend on whether one views compulsory military
service as an opportunity to obtain an education and to serve one's
country or as punishment or deprivation of liberty.
123
In any event, a registrant from any minority group is likely to
go through the procedures just described encumbered by problems
in addition to those faced by the white middle class registrant.1
24
Briefly stated, a black or brown 1 25 registrant is less likely to be
familiar with filling in forms and keeping copies of communications
to and from the System. He is much less likely to have heard of
conscientious objection to participation in war, or of SSS Form 150
on which to apply for it. Although he is more likely to be planning to
contribute to the support of his parents, brothers and sisters, he is
less likely to be aware that this entitles him to a III-A deferment,
and he is more likely to be unemployed for a considerable period. 26
He is more likely to be trying to get into an apprenticeship program
that might entitle him to a II-A occupational deferment, and less
likely to get in. 27 He is also less likely to have had a thorough
physical examination or to know the nature of physical disabilities
from which he suffers.12  He probably has moved several times and
will be unable to obtain old medical or other records. He probably
cannot find an expert to consult about how to fill out classification
Form 100 in order to describe accurately the reasons he should be
deferred at age 18, or to express his right to a II-A, II-S, or III-A on
the basis of the "deferred dreams"' 29 our society presently requires
of virtually all members of minority groups.
If a black registrant surmounts many of these obstacles and ob-
122 For example, black registrants are less likely to plan to qualify for a
II-S deferment because they cannot attend college full-time, for economic
reasons. See U.S. COMm'N ON CivIL RIGHTS, RACIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS 79, 87 (1967).
123 See generally Dawley, Special Problems of Black Draftees, 26 GUILD
PRACTITIONER 107 (1967).
124 See generally C. BROWN, MANCHILD IN Tm PROMISED LAND (1965); D.
GREGORY with R. LipsyTE, NIGGER (1964); A. HALEY, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
MALCOM X (1965).
125 See cases of Negro registrants reported in 13 Civ. IB. DOCK., Nos.
125.19-.33 (1968).
126 C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN BLAcK AND WHITE 237 (1964).
127 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVI RIGHTS, REPORT ON EMPLOYMNT 160-61 (1961).
128 See, e.g., N.Y. STATE ADvisoaY COMM. TO U.S. COMM'N ON CIVm RIGHTS,
REPORT ON NEW YORK CITY: HEALTH FACILITIES (1964).
129 Cf. L. Hughes, Montage of a Dream Deferred, in SELECTED POEMS OF
LANGSTON HUGHES (comp. 1951):
What happens to a dream deferred?
Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun?
Or fester like a sore-and then run?
Does it stink like rotten meat?
Or crust and sugar over-like a syrupy sweet?
Or does it explode?
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tains the forms to apply for a medical, occupational, dependency, or
CO deferment, he is not likely to find on his local board or appeal
board any member who understands and empathizes with his life
style. Assuming that all 4,080 local boards have been reconstituted
since July 1, 1967 to increase the proportion of minority group mem-
bers, he may still face a board chaired by a white racist.
30
Physical Examination
If the appeal to the appeal board fails and there is no successful
presidential appeal, the registrant will receive an order from his
local board to report for a physical examination.' 3 ' Prior to the ex-
amination there is almost no opportunity for a registrant to discover
what physical defects result in classifications of IV-F (permanently
unacceptable for physical reasons) or I-Y (temporarily unacceptable,
to be reviewed periodically). Registrants are not told that there is
a list of Medical Fitness Standards for Induction in Peacetime Army
32
and, if they discover the existence of such a list, 3 3 they cannot
obtain copies of it by asking their local boards, the state director,
the national director, or the Surgeon General's office. Attorneys who
have requested the list by name from these sources have, after some
correspondence, obtained copies of a list, unannotated and without
the recent supplements. The reason for keeping the list confiden-
tial is nowhere stated.
34
Army physical examinations are not conducted by the System;
they are conducted by the Army at its induction centers. The Sys-
tem directs the civilian registrant to submit to the Defense Depart-
ment examination under threat of a delinquency notice and immediate
induction. 13 The Defense Department has worked out a careful
series of tests which each registrant must take individually over a
number of hours. The examination is structured to tell the Defense
Department whether the registrant can carry out the kinds of tasks
he may- be assigned as a draftee in the Army, and includes examina-
130 See Brief for Appellant, United States v. Du Vernay, No. 24,132 (5th
Cir., filed appx. Oct., 1967) (on file in Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library,
Berkeley), in which appellant alleges the draft board chairman has organ-
izational ties with the Ku Klux Klan.
131 32 C.F.R. § 1628.10 (1967).
132 C 14, AR 40-501 (reprinted in full in TiE NEW DRAFT LAW: A MANUAL
FOR LAWYERS AND COUNSELORS, supra note 44, at 235:38-:42).
'33 Mentioned in 32 C.F.R. § 1628.1 (1967).
134 Exec. Order No. 10,001, 13 Fed. Reg. 5488 (1948), as amended, Exec.
Order No. 10,594, 20 Fed. Reg. 740 (1955) (32 C.F.R. § 1629.1 (1962)) contained
an alphabetical list of obvious defects and manifest conditions which disqual-
ify for service in the armed forces. It was revoked in its entirety by Exec.
Order No. 11,098, 28 Fed. Reg. 2618 (1963).
135 32 C.F.R. §§ 1628.16, 1642.4(a) (1967); 32 C.F.R. § 1642.13 (1967), as
amended, Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg. 9787 (1967).
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tions and tests of major parts of the body, IQ tests, and an emotional
evaluation, all given by trained doctors.13
6
This is the first structured, lengthy, exhaustive investigation of
any aspect of the registrant's eligibility for deferment or induction.
Attorneys with experience on draft cases have concluded that some-
times it is the worst place to prove a disabling physical defect because
of the mass nature of the examination. Letters from private physi-
cians taken to the examination tend to be given to the wrong official.
Often a member of the military requests the letter rather than an
examining doctor concerned with the specialty discussed in the letter.
However, the registrant who takes a letter or report from his phy-
sician concerning his defects or diseases will usually receive closer
attention (and perhaps even a consultation with a specialist) than
one who arrives empty-handed. Nevertheless, obvious defects that the
Army later finds are not infrequently overlooked at the examina-
tion. Some experienced counsel allege that "CO" is stamped on the
outside of the file of each registrant who has applied for 1-0 or I-A-O
status and that this may prejudice the decision on physical suit-
ability for service.
Loyalty-Security Examination
At the physical examination, the registrant is customarily given
a DD Form 98,137 designed to indicate whether the registrant is
acceptable to the Defense Department in terms of political be-
liefs, affiliations or memberships. The form lists all of the organiza-
tions on the Attorney General's list and asks the registrant a number
of questions about his relationship with the organizations or with
people related to them. Registrants report that an Army officer
usually tells the registrants to write "no" in answer to each question
and to sign their names at the bottom.
The form contains this language:
You are advised that in accordance with the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States you cannot be compelled to furnish
any statements which you may reasonably believe may lead to your
prosecution for a crime. This is the only reason for which you may
avail yourself of the privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment in
refusing to answer questions under Part IV below. Claiming the
Fifth Amendment will not by itself constitute sufficient grounds to
exempt you from military service for reasons of security. You are
136 But see Leong v. Woods, No. 921235 (Los Angeles Co. Super. Ct., filed
Nov. 9, 1967), alleging medical malpractice against a doctor at the induction
center examination who found plaintiff acceptable for military service despite
his serious and persistent psychiatric disorders. The complaint is on file in
the Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library, Berkeley.
137 Armed Forces Security Questionnaire (June 1, 1959) (reprinted in full
in THE Npw DRAFT LAW: A MANuAL FOR LAwYERS AND CouNsELoRs, supra
note 44, 235:67-:69).
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not required to answer any questions in this questionnaire, the answer
to which might be incriminating. If you do claim the privilege
granted by the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer any questions,
you should make a statement to that effect after the question involved.
If a registrant answers anything other than "no" to any question,
or if he refuses to answer any question on the basis suggested, or
on any other basis (first amendment freedom of thought, right of
privacy), he is usually taken out of the normal processing and called
into a room where he is questioned by someone from Military In-
telligence, and occasionally, also by a psychiatrist. From that point
forward, the procedure is similar to any other government loyalty-
security check. 3 8 The standards used by Military Intelligence are no
more precise than those used by civil service.
After some months, the registrant receives a notification from
the Defense Department, not from the System, that he is acceptable
or unacceptable on security grounds. If he is found unacceptable,
he will not be drafted unless he appeals from the classification, has a
successful hearing and is declared acceptable.
Conclusion of SSS Procedure
Sometime after successful completion of the physical examination,
the local board sends the registrant an induction order. At this
point, all of the procedures of the SSS have been concluded. Noth-
ing remains to be done by the System; it remains only for the regis-
trant to appear for induction under the order. The procedure is
thus different from that followed at the time of Falbo v. United
States,139 when the physical examination took place at the time the
registrant appeared for induction, and many who appeared for in-
duction were rejected at that point.140
Under current procedures, 10 to 15 percent of the registrants are
rejected when they report for induction. 141 The possibility that the
registrant will not be inducted rests primarily with the inductee at
this point. He may refuse induction. Or he may refuse to fill out
DD Form 398,142 which contains loyalty-security questions simi-
lar to those on DD Form 98. If he does the latter, the military au-
thorities at the induction center may process him for induction any-
way (particularly if he had previously been cleared after refusal to
fill out Form DD 98); they may call their central loyalty-security
138 For procedural details, see, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).
139 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
140 See id. at 533 & n.7.
141 MARSHALL COmm'N REP. 201.
142 Family History Questionnaire (pertinent questions on the form re-
printed in THE NEW DRAFT LAW: A MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND CouNsELoRs,
supra note 44, at 235:69).
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data center and quickly decide whether to induct him anyway, or
they may send him home and conduct a regular Military Intelligence
check. These alternatives are open to the Army only if the registrant
behaves in a certain manner, and none of the alternatives requires
any farther action by the Selective Service System, which completed
its work concerning the registrant when it ordered him inducted.
Delinquency
When a registrant performs certain acts, such as returning his
draft card to his local board, or fails to perform certain acts, such as
appearing for his physical examination, the local board may send him
a delinquency warning:
1. You are hereby notified that this Local Board is considering de-
claring you to be a delinquent because of your failure to perform the
following duty or duties required of you under the selective service
law: [e.g., to have in your possession a valid registration certificate
and a valid registration card].
2. You are hereby directed to report to this Local Board immediately
in person or by mail, or to take this notice to the Local Board nearest
you for advice as to what you should do.
3. Your willful failure to perform the foregoing duty or duties is a
violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, and such failure may result in your being declared delin-
quent. A delinquent registrant loses his eligibility for defermenf and
-may be placed in a class immediately available for service. He is
ordered for induction ahead of other registrants.
4. This Local Board may excuse your delinquency status if it finds
that the reason for noncompliance was not willful and you comply.
In any event, this document becomes part of your permanent selective
service file and should such delinquency be excused any further non- -
compliance on your part could result in your immediate induction.1
43
The warning may be followed by a delinquency notice, or the notice
may be sent without the warning. The language in the delinquency
notice is identical to the language in the warning, except that para-
graph one announces that the local board "has declared" the regis-
trant a delinquent, and paragraph 3 reads:
3. Your. willful failure to perform the foregoing duty or duties is
a violation of the Universal Military Training and Service Act, as
amended, which is punishable by imprisonment for as much as 5 years
or a fine of as much as $10,000, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment. You may be classified in class I-A as a delinquent and ordered
to report for induction.
4 4
These forms indicate an awareness on the part of the board that
the registrant has committed an act -or failed to perform ail act that
may result in his immediate reclassification and induction or his
prosecution for draft refusal. Yet neither form suggests that the
143 Cal. Selective Service System, Delinquency Warning, Cal. form No.
304 (undated).
'44 Delinquency Notice, SSS Form No. 304 (5-26-65).
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registrant consult with an attorney, that he has a right to bring
counsel with him when he reports to the local board "for advice as
to what you should do," that when he reports he will have the right
to remain silent and the right to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, that anything he says when he reports may be used
against him in a later criminal prosecution (or a later administrative
proceeding within the System), or that he may stop the proceedngs
at any time in order to consult his attorney.145
Yet a finding of delinquency is clearly the first step in a series of
actions by the System that will inevitably result in the registrant's
becoming a defendant in a federal criminal case unless the registrant
renounces his previous action and performs the act he previously re-
fused to perform, or the government, for its own reasons, chooses not
to prosecute him. The fact that delinquency is a stage in the adminis-
trative proceedings cannot change the fact that it is also a stage in
the criminal proceedings.
146
The language in the delinquency warning and notice indicates
that the System recognizes that the registrant who receives these
forms has reached a critical stage in the criminal proceedings, under
the standards set in Escobedo v. Illinois. 47 If so, the rule of United
States v. Wade148 would seem to be applicable:
In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama 149 and succeeding
cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the ac-
cused to determine whether the presence of his counsel is necessary
to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by
his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against him
and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls
upon us to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defend-
ant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of
counsel to help avoid that prejudice.150
In a companion case to Miranda v. Arizona,'5' the federal govern-
ment admitted in its brief that it had "no doubt ... that it is possible
for a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to be violated during in-
custody questioning by a law-enforcement officer.' 52 Considering
the age and probable inexperience of the delinquent registrants, the
general failure to consult counsel prior to going to the local board,
and the prohibition against bringing counsel to the local board for a
personal appearance, it seems likely that some or all registrants may
145 Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
:146 Cf. United States v. Wierzchucki, 248 F. Supp. 788 (D. Wis. 1965)
(dictum).
'47 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
148 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
149 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
150 378 U.S. at 227.
151 Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
152 Id. at 463 (quoting from brief, Westover v. United States, 384 U.S. 436
(1966)).
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have their fifth amendment rights violated during questioning by
someone from the local board when they comply with the delinquency
warning or notice and report for pretrial confrontation under cir-
cumstances in which the registrants believe they must answer.
15 3
Appearance for Induction
Under the 1967 Act, a registrant who wants to challenge any
action of the System (such as the local board's rejection of his appli-
cation for a deferment or exemption on any ground, the appeal board's
affirmance of that rejection, the decision on a presidential appeal, or
the finding of delinquency), can do so only by making himself
liable for criminal prosecution for refusal of induction.15 Under
decisions since Falbo v. United States, 55 the registrant must appear
at the induction center at the appointed time and refuse to take the
symbolic step forward into the Army and the oath in order to exhaust
his administrative remedies. Failure to do this allegedly will result
in his being unable to raise in a later criminal prosecution for draft
refusal all of the issues concerning the administrative process. 56
If the registrant appears for induction and refuses to take the step
forward, frequently he is asked to sign a statement indicating that
he has refused induction. That is, the registrant is customarily re-
quired to incriminate himself both by the act of refusal and in writ-
ing. A registrant who announces to the authorities in charge of the
induction center at the beginning of the proceedings that he plans to
refuse induction is not warned that anything he says or does or
writes can and will be used against him in a court, that he has a right
to the assistance of counsel and to consult counsel before deciding
whether to sign the statement concerning his refusal, that he has a
right to ask counsel to accompany him to the FBI interview con-
ducted later the same day, or that he has a right to refuse to sign
the statement. Similarly, the registrant who makes no announcement
but simply does not complete the induction process is given no warn-
ing. The file is sent to the local board and then to the state di-
rector of Selective Service, who reviews the file and recommends
further action by the board (reclassification or reopening,157 if there
153 Compare the description of reactions of Yale undergraduate and grad-
uate students to questioning by FBI agents in connection with the return of
draft cards at Yale. Faculty Note, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967). See also Local
Board Memorandum No. 85 (Oct. 24, 1967).
'54 See text accompanying notes 160-64 infra.
155 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
156 See Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 115-16, 123 (1946). However,
in some cases defense counsel have raised all issues despite failure of the
defendant to appear for refusal of induction. See, e.g., Margolis, Trying a
Case Under the Selective Service Law, 26 Guzm PRAcToNER 100 (1967).
'57 See, e.g., United States v. Burlich, 257 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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are flagrant errors in procedure) or recommends that the board for-
ward the file to the United States Attorney, where it is reviewed
further.
Criminal Charge
When the administrative determination is adverse to the regis-
trant, there is no way to compromise a draft case, as can be done
with a tax case, for instance. The System will not settle for a regis-
trant continuing to work for the government in a nonmilitary
occupation, such as a school teacher, when the Defense Department
increases the quotas enough so that registrants must be reclassified
from I1-A to I-A. If a registrant is not willing to perform military
service for the government when ordered to do so, and the govern-
ment rejects his offer to perform alternate civilian service as a CO,
he cannot pay money and hire a substitute,158 as he once could. Nor
can he enter the service with the understanding that he is willing to
defend the continental United States but that he is unwilling to
fight overseas in wars he considers unnecessary, a demand that
seems to go back to Magna Carta. 59
At no point is there the kind of judicial review available in a
lawsuit concerning matters of property, tort, or contracts. At no
point is there a plenary hearing before an impartial tribunal on the
merits of the registrant's claim for deferment. The 1967 Act seems
to eliminate all judicial review in noncriminal preinduction pro-
ceedings, c0° although the constitutionality of this section is now be-
fore three-judge courts convened in the Northern District of Cal-
ifornia' 01 and the Southern District of New York,162 and on a peti-
158 See 50 AP'. U.S.C. § 458 (1964).
159 See Magna Carta, Ch. 16, discussed in W. McKEcHNiE, MAGNA CARTA:
A CoIvImENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN WITH AN ISTORICAL
INTRODUCTION 306-08, 86-93 (1905) and proposal by Sen. Gruening to amend
the 1967 Act to prohibit the sending of drafted men to fight in Viet Nam
without their approval. 113 CONG. REc. 6,754, 6,756 (daily ed. May 11, 1967).
160 See Selec. Serv. Act § 8(c), amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 460(b) (3)
(1964): "No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing
of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or the President, except as
a defense to a criminal prosecution instituted under section 12 of this title,
after the registrant has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an
order to report for induction, or for civilian work in the case of a registrant
determined to be opposed to participation in war in any form: Provided, That
such review shall go to the question of the jurisdiction herein reserved to local
boards, appeal boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact
for the classification assigned to such registrant." Cf. Iraci v. Scanlon, 202 F.
Supp. 42 (E.D.N.Y. 1961).
101 See order convening three-judge court, Petersen v. Clark, No. 47,888
(N.D. Cal., filed Jan. 9, 1968) (order entered Jan. 23, 1968).
162 Boyd v. Clark, No. 67 Civ. 2529 (S.D.N.Y., filed June 29, 1967)
(amended complaint, supplemental memorandum in support of motion for
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tion for certiorari pending before the United States Supreme Court.163
When the registrant is charged with violation of the Act, either
by information or indictment, the issues in the criminal case are
limited by the prosecution to three: (1) is this defendant the person
who was ordered inducted; (2) did this defendant refuse induction;
(3) is there no "basis in fact"' 64 for the classification by the draft
board.
From the Point of View of the Local Draft Board
The Selective Service System is an administrative agency super-
vised by a Director appointed by the President and responsible di-
rectly to him.16 5 Since passage of the peacetime draft law of 1940,
this position has been held by General Lewis B. Hershey, whose
name has become synonymous with the draft.
The Director prescribes regulations and issues forms with the
force of regulations.16 6 The regulations are published in the Federal
Register without notice or hearing and can be changed at any time
by the Director. They may be changed when System practices are
criticized by government committees. 167 How promptly local boards
receive copies of new regulations and Local Board Memos is not
known to the author.
In addition, the Director sends to members of the System letters
and memos that are neither regulations nor Local Board Memos.
These letters are considered by many local board clerks to be con-
fidential and will not be shown to registrants or their counsel on
re.quest. (This refusal sometimes continues after the letters are
published in the daily newspapers.)168
Under the regulations, calls are placed by the Secretary of
convening of three-judge court, affidavit in support of motion for temporary
injundtion, on file in Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Library, Berkeley).
163 Oestereich v. Local Bd. No. 11, petition for cert. filed, U.S. Sup. Ct.
(Mar. 1968) (brief of appellant in 10th Cir. on file at Meiklejohn Civil Liber-
ties Librari, Berkeley). See also Frantz & Leonard, Judicial Review of Selec-
tive Service Orders, 26 GumD PRACTiTiONER 85 (1967).164 Selec. Serv. Act § 8(c), amending 50 APP. U.S.C. § 460(b) (3) (1964),
provides in part that judicial review "shall go to the question of . . .juris-
diction ... only when there is no basis in fact for the classification .... 
165- See 50 APP. U.S.C. § 460(a) (1964).
166 32 C.F.R. § 1606.51 (1967).
167 For example, after the Marshall Commission recommended 30 days
instead of 10 days for appeals, MARSHALL COMM'N REP. 36, the System changed
its Regulations. Exec. Order 11,350, § 2(b), 32 Fed. Reg. 6961, amending 32
C.F.R. § 1626.2(c) (1) (1967) (appeal to Appeal Board); id. § 3, amending 32
C.F.R. § 1627.3 (1967) (appeal to President).
168 Experience of the author in seeking a copy of Hershey's Oct. 26, 1967,
merho from the clerk of a Berkeley draft board on Nov. 10, 1967.
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Defense with the Director of the System, 69 who allocates among the
several states the number of men to be inducted. 70 The state
directors allocate the number of men required from each local
board.' 71 There is no procedure by which a local board or a state
director can appeal from its allotted number. The local boards
make the order of selection for induction on the basis of the regula-
tions,172 and deliver the men for induction.
173
The selective nature of the process is built into the system as
well as being part of the name of the agency. Problems with fair-
ness of selection have long been apparent, and the Marshall Com-
mission report is entitled, significantly: In Pursuit of Equity: Who
Serves When Not All Serve? Most of the proposals of the Marshall
Commission to insure greater equity were not included in the 1967
Act, nor were a number of due process reforms suggested by Sena-
tor Morse.17 4
Intent of Congress
After some argument, 175 the 1967 draft law was entitled the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967. The title accurately reflects
the nature of the system it covers: a selective system of military
service, not a universal system. The Act lists categories of men who
do not need to register with the System,176 categories of men who
do not need to serve while they are engaged in work of certain
kinds, 177 and a category of men who do not need to serve in the mili-
tary.7 8  Under the Act, selection of men to fit into each category
is given to the local civilian boards, with the civilian appeal pro-
cedure already described'
7 9
Congress declared in the Act its intentions on the method by
which these selections are to be made:
169 32 C.F.R. § 1631.4, as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed. Reg.
9787 (1967).
170 Id. § 1631.5(a) (1967), as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,360, 32 Fed.
Reg. 9787 (1967).
171 Id. § 1631.6 (1967).
172 See id. § 1631.7, as amended, Exec. Order No. 11,360, § 8(c), 32 Fed.
Reg. 9787 (1967).
173 Id. § 1632.1 (1967).
174 See, e.g., Morse amendment to provide right to counsel, 113 CONG. REc.
6778-79 (daily ed. May 11, 1967).
175 See S. REP. No. 209, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1967).
170 Selec. Serv. Act § 5, amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 456 (a) (1964).
177 Id. § 6, amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(h) (1964).
178 Id. § 7, amending 50 App. U.S.C. § 456(j) (1964).
179 See 50 App. U.S.C. § 460(b) (3) (1964), as amended, Selec. Serv. Act
§ 8. Query: Does 32 C.F.R. § 1622.60 (1967) contradict this plan for civilian
operation of the System by giving unfettered discretion on all classifications
to the Director, who comes from the military and whose ties to the armed
forces may not have been completely severed?
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(c) The Congress further declares that in a free society the obliga-
tions and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve
components thereof should be shared generally, in accordance with a
system of selection which is fair and just, and which is consistent with
the maintenance of an effective national economy.180
This section is quoted in the regulations: "Classification is the key
to selection and it must be accomplished in the spirit of the... Act
"181
Elsewhere in the Act the concept of fairness in procedures is
also mentioned. One section discusses the utilization of industry
to obtain prompt delivery of military materials whose procurement
has been authorized by Congress, and directs the President to grant
"a fair share" of the orders to American small business, and that "fair
and just compensation" shall be paid for such articles.8 2 The Sys-
tem has not issued any regulations under these sections so that it
is not possible to know what procedures might be devised for insuring
fairness.
It is significant, then, that Congress has provided that fairness
shall be the rule in each of the three fields of procurement required
by a military action: men, materiel, and money. The Director ac-
knowledged this direction in the regulations issued to govern the pro-
curement of men.
8 3
More Questions To Be Answered
Regardless of congressional intent, the Constitution guarantees
certain minimum standards of due process, and Congress has guar-
anteed others in the Administrative Procedure Act,8 4 made applica-
ble to most federal administrative agencies, though not to the Selec-
tive Service System. 8 5 These minimum standards will be summar-
ized in a chart in Part II, together with the constitutional, deci-
sional, and statutory authority for each. The chart will then indi-
cate which of these standards the System is now required to meet
under the Act, its regulations, Local Board Memos, or other directives
from General Hershey.
180 50 ApP. U.S.C. § 451(c) (1964).
181 32 C.F.R. § 1622.1(b) (1967).
182 50 ApP. U.S.C. §§ 468(a), (d).
183 But cf. Amendment No. 523 submitted by Sen. Long (Mo.) to S. 1195,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967), to establish an Office of Administrative Ombuds-
man with jurisdiction over certain federal agencies, to add the Selective
Service System to its jurisdiction because "I have been hearing more and
more complaints about the operation of the Selective Service System. To
date, it does not appear that the System is altogether responsive to them."
114 CONG. REc. 935 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1968).
184 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-59 (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
185 The System is excluded by 50 AP. U.S.C. § 463(b) (1964) from the
operation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), except for 5 U.S.C. §
552 (Supp. II, 1965-1966).
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This analysis leads to a series of questions concerning criminal
due process and the federal administrative proceedings conducted
by the System:
Should the due process standards guaranteed in a federal crim-
inal case govern a proceeding that will become a federal criminal
case if the administrative decision is contested? If so, what is the
critical stage at which the administrative proceeding becomes the first
step in the criminal case? Does the intent of the agency to punish
86
certain registrants for their behavior change the character of the
administrative proceedings as to those registrants, making them eli-
gible, at an earlier stage in the administrative proceedings, for the due
process accorded criminal defendants? And if the registrants exercise
the liberties guaranteed under the first amendment to express their
opposition to the war, 8 7 can the System declare them delinquent and
pave the way for their induction or prosecution without according
them due process required in criminal cases? In addition, if con-
scription would result in deprivation of the liberty"8 of a registrant,
can he demand the procedural due process to which he would be
entitled if conscription were labelled "punishment"?
The next series of questions concerns standards of administrative
fairness and the System:
If the federal criminal due process standards in federal criminal
cases should not govern the System, should the minimum standards
of fair procedure required by the Administrative Procedure Act gov-
ern this agency, now exempt from all of the formal requirements
of that Act? If not, what are the minimum standards of fair pro-
cedure for an agency not fully covered by the Act, such as the
Immigration and Naturalization Service? Are its functions similar
enough to those of the Selective Service System to warrant its mini-
mum standards governing the System?
If none of these models will fit the System, what standards
should govern it? Is it necessary for the local board to be an impar-
tial decision-making agency, like a court or hearing officer? Is it
possible for the board to reach each individual decision on classifica-
tion in a fair and impartial manner when it is aware that it must
meet its share of a call based on military needs rather than on its
previous classifications?' 9 Is it necessary to have an effective
right to appeal from the local board to a higher administrative
agency? Since the System boasts that "There is no broader or more
180 Cf. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
187 See Brief for Appellant, Ostereich v. Local Board No. 11, No. 363 Misc.
(10th Cir., filed Feb. 1968).
188 Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
189 Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 373 U.S. 510 (1927).
MVay 19681 SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM 134"7
1348 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
easily effected appeal privilege in any similar governmental struc-
ture,"19 0 can it find a way to provide, not only the mechanics of
appeal, but the essence of effective administrative appeals?
The final question is a pragmatic one, but it must be posed: If
the System is not now meeting the requisite standards in the proc-
essing and classification of every American male between the ages
of 18 and 36, can it solve the practical problems of providing pro-
cedural fairness to each?
190 SELECTIVE SERvIcE SYSTEM, TAKING APPEALS FRoIm SELECTIVE SERVIcE
CLASSIFICATIONS (1967).
